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THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
IN BANKRUPTCY: RESOLUTION TO DIAMETRICALLY
OPPOSED GOALS
JASON V. STITT*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, public concern regarding the
environment has grown steadily.' To help deal with the concerns
over pollutants and the health risks associated with them, Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA).' CERCLA imposes strict liability on
parties that are responsible for environmental catastrophes.3 Through
this legislation, Congress attempted to remove threats generated by
hazardous waste disposal and to place the burden of cleaning up
damaged areas on the responsible parties. 4 The cost of cleaning up
these contaminated areas often totals millions of dollars.5 As a result
are
of the high costs, many of those
6 found liable under CERCLA
forced into bankruptcy for relief.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 enacted the current
Bankruptcy Code.7 One of the primary goals of the Bankruptcy Code
is to provide the debtor with a "fresh start" by relieving the debtor of
existing debt at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.8 However,
relieving the debtor of the cleanup costs generated by CERCLA
frustrates the goals of the Act.
Clearly, there is a clash between the strict liability of
CERCLA and the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code. In many
cases, one policy goal trumps the other, but court decisions have
lacked consistency in placing priority.9 In every case, courts have
found it impossible to satisfy the goals of both acts.' 0 This note
" Senior Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW. J.D. 2002, University of Kentucky College of Law.
'See John C. Ryland, When Policies Collide: The Conflict Between the Bankruptcy
Code, 24 MEM. ST. U.L. REV 739 (1994).
242 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3See Jennifer A. Pasquarella, Note, In this Corner, We Have the Bankruptcy Code's
Discharge Provisions and in This Corner, CERCLA, a Strict Liability Statute: In Re Reading
Company, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 561 (1998) (citing Roy B. True, Comment, Dischargeability of
in Bankruptcy, 61 UMKC L. REv. 329 (1992)).
CERCLA Liability
4
See Catherine A. Barth, Note, EPA Runs 'CERCLAs 'Around Bankruptcy Law: In
Re CMC HeartlandPartners, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 203 (1994).
5See Ryland, supra note 1,at 739.
6
See id. at 740.
7Pub. L. No. 95-958 (1978).
'See Ryland, supra note 1, at 740.
9See Barth, supra note 4, at 204.
"See id.
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focuses on how courts have dealt with the problems of discharging
debts resulting from CERCLA liability in bankruptcy. Part I of this
note provides more background on CERCLA and on the Bankruptcy
Code. Part II focuses on the relevant case law regarding the clash
between the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA. Part III provides
suggestions as to how courts and Congress should handle such
situations.
II. CERCLA
Prior to enacting CERCLA in 1979, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) identified over 2000 hazardous waste sites
nationwide." In response to what Congress perceived as a growing
threat to public health and the environment, the 9 6 th Congress hastily
drafted CERCLA. " CERCLA provides that when an "imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment" actually exists or is threatened, the President has the
power to respond.' 3 In turn, the President has delegated this power to
the EPA.' 4 The EPA has the power to order, via judicial or
administrative enforcement proceedings, "potentially responsible
parties" (PRP)' 5 to take remedial actions at a hazardous site.
Additionally, if the PRP does not clean up the area, CERCLA
authorizes the EPA or other state agencies to take "appropriate action
to respond to contaminated sites, and to seek reimbursement for these
costs from responsible parties."'16 In addition to being responsible for
all of the response costs incurred in cleaning up the site, the PRP is
also liable for costs involved with health studies leading to the action
and for any resulting damages to the environment. 7
In a typical CERCLA case, there are multiple PRPs that are
liable for the costs.' 8 Each PRP is strictly liable for the costs of the
"See
id. at 206.
2

1See id. (citing Bradford F. Whitman, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRACTICE 13 (1991)).
13See Ryland, supra note 1,at 741 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)(1) (1988)).
"See id.
1"42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); See NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACrICE 2d § 149:3

(2001). The key terms in the provision imposing liability are "owner or operator" and "person."
The categories of liable parties are summarized as follows: Current Owner or Operator - The
current owner or operator of a facility from which a release of hazardous substances has

occurred; Prior Owner or Operator - Any prior owner or operator of a facility at the time
hazardous substances were disposed of at such facility and from which a release of hazardous
substances has occurred; Generator or Responsible Person - Any person who arranged by
contract, agreement, or otherwise for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person at, or transport to, a facility from which a release of hazardous

substances has occurred; Transporter - The persons who transported the hazardous substances
to the facility from which a release of hazardous substances.
"NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 2d § 149.1 (2001).
7
t See Barth, supra note 4, at 209.
8

1 See NoRTOBANvKRuPTCYLAWAD

DPRACTICE 2d § 149:4 (2001).
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clean up unless it is able to employ one of the defenses found in 42
U.S.C. § 4607(a). 19 It would seem that under CERCLA, the EPA is
armed with the tools necessary to remove environmental and health
hazards and to make sure the costs for their removal are paid by those
responsible.20 Unfortunately, this statutory scheme has lead to
bankruptcy proceedings for
2 1 many PRPs, effectively frustrating
goals.
CERCLA
Congress's
III. BANKRUPTCY

Article I § 8, clause 4 of the Constitution adopted a provision
allowing the federal government to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcy.22 The current Bankruptcy Code 23 (hereinafter,
the Code) provides a unified set of laws covering insolvency,
liquidation and reorganization.24 In order to fully appreciate the
Code, it is necessary to understand the five basic public policy goals
that control it:
(1) The preservation of the estate's assets through the
imposition of an automatic stay of actions against the
estate during the pendency of a bankruptcy
proceeding;
(2) The provisions of priorities for certain classes of
creditors entitled to special treatment either because
of the law's protection of their property right or
because of the public policy need to have payment
made to certain types of creditors, such as employees
and taxing entities;
(3) Equitable treatment of creditors through equal and
pro-rated treatment of all creditors that fall within
the same classification;
(4) Allowing debtors a fresh start through a discharge of
debts or a plan for reorganization; and
(5) Reorganizing debtors in order to preserve jobs,
thereby protecting the economy and providing a
stable tax base for the government 5
9
1 See Ryland, supra note 1, at 742 n. 19. "CERCLA's defenses to liability are limited

to situations where the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance was caused solely
by an Act of God, and act of war, or an act or omission of a third party other than an employee,
agent, or another with some type of contractual relationship with the defendant."
'OSee Barth, supra note 4, at 212.
2

See id.
"U.S. CONST. ART. 1, § 8, cl. 4 ("To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.").
"See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 10.01.
"See id. at § 10.02.
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The public policy goals of the Code frequently conflict with each
they also contradict the public policy
other, but, as later discussed,
26
goals of environmental law.
Bankruptcy proceedings commence with the filing of a
bankruptcy petition, which may be filed voluntarily by the debtor or
involuntarily by creditors. 27 As soon as the petition is filed, creditors
are barred from taking any action to collect the debts owed by the
debtor, under what is known as an automatic stay.28 The discharge
provisions of the Code also serve to protect debtors.
Chapter 7 of the Code deals with the administration of
liquidation bankruptcy cases.2 9 Liquidation deals with a situation in
which the debtor turns over all of his assets to a trustee, who then
converts those assets into cash. The cash is then used to pay creditors
under the priority system established by the Code.3 ° Once the
proceeds of the debtor's assets are distributed, the debtor is relieved
of the debts.3'
Under Chapter 11 of the Code, corporations may continue
operating by reorganizing their debts rather than liquidating and
going out of business.32 Chapter 11 requires the corporation to create
a re-organization plan that fairly and equitably treats its debts, and the
plan must be accepted by all of the creditors before reorganization
can be carried out.3 3 While the actual process of creating a plan is
complicated, the result is not as difficult. "Once a planned
reorganization is formulated, accepted and confirmed, the obligations
of the debtor essentially are discharged. The only exception is that
they are required to be performed in accordance with the plan. 34
Another key chapter that creates conflict between
environmental law and bankruptcy is Chapter 5, Subchapter I of the
Code, which deals with identifying creditors and claims against the
debtor.35 Only if a debt is determined to be a "claim" under Chapter
5, will it be dischargeable under the Code.36 Simply put, if an item is
26

See id.
2"See Ryland, supra note I,
at 742; see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE
§ 10.05. "The stay enjoins actions to create, enforce, perfect or collect liens or judgments
against the debtor or his property."
8
See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 10.05 (citing I I U.S.C. § 362(a)).
29
See id.at § 10.03.
3
See id.
3"See Barth, supra note 4, at 214.
"2See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 10.03.

"See id.
"'See id. (citing I I U.S.C. § 1141).
35See
id.
36
See id. at § 10.07, §101(5) (stating that "claim" means: "Right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,

matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured"; or "right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or
not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
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determined not to be a claim or not to have arisen when the
bankruptcy petition is filed, then it will not be discharged. 37 Most of
the litigation involved in the conflict between environmental law and
bankruptcy centers not only on whether the CERCLA liability
constitutes a claim, but also on when the liability for that claim
arises.38
IV. Is CERCLA LIABILITY

A CLAIM THAT MAY BE DISCHARGED

UNDER THE CODE?

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
environmental obligations may be discharged under the Code in Ohio
v. Kovacs.39 In this case, the State of Ohio obtained an injunction
that ordered Kovacs to clean up a hazardous waste site.40 Kovacs
failed to comply with the obligations under the injunction.4 The
state appointed a receiver to take control of the site and to clean up
the hazardous waste.42 The receiver took possession of the site, but
had not yet completed the cleanup tasks, when Kovacs filed for
personal bankruptcy.4 3 The state filed a complaint in Bankruptcy
Court to have Kovacs' obligation under the order to clean up the site
declared non-dischargeable because it was not a "debt," or a "liability
on a claim," as defined by the Code.44 The Bankruptcy Court ruled
against the state, and both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 4' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine "whether in the circumstances present
here, Kovacs' obligation under the injunction is a 'debt' or 'liability
'
on a claim' subject to discharge under the Code.AG

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.")
37
8See id.
3 See Denise M. Schuh, The Cents of It: Dischargeabilityand Environmental Claims
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 191, 193-94 (1994).
'969 U.S. 274 (1985).
'"See id. at 275. Kovacs was the chief executive officer and stockholder of ChemDyne Corp., which, with other business entities, operated an industrial and hazardous waste
disposal site in Hamilton, Ohio. In 1976, the state sued Kovacs and the business entities in state
court for polluting public waters, maintaining a nuisance, and causing fish kills, all in violation
of state environmental laws. In 1979, both in his individual capacity and on behalf of ChemDyne, Kovacs signed a stipulation and judgment entry settling the lawsuit. Among other things,
the stipulation enjoined the defendants from causing further pollution of the air or public
waters, forbade bringing additional industrial wastes onto the site, required the defendants to
remove specified wastes from the property, and ordered the payment of $75,000 to compensate
the state for injury to wildlife. Id. at 276.

"42 See id. at 276.
See id.
43

See id.
"4See id. at 277.
4
5Kovacs, 69 U.S. at 277.
"See id. at 275.
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The Court held that Ohio was seeking money from Kovacs to
pay the cost of the cleanup.47 Therefore, the State had, in effect,

converted Kovacs' equitable obligation into a monetary obligation.48
This conversion rendered the claim dischargeable under the Code.49
The Court limited the application of its holding by noting that the
decision did not address the situation that would occur when a prepetition appointment of a receiver had not taken place.50 The Court
held open the idea that a lower court would have the ability to rule
"that a prospective order from an environmental regulatory agency is
not a claim under the Code and therefore such an obligation would be
non-dischargeable." 51 Consequently, while the Court did settle the
issue of whether an environmental claim is a "claim" that may be
discharged under the Code, it did not settle the question of when a
liability under various environmental laws becomes a "claim."
V. WHEN A CLAIM BECOMES A CLAIM

As Circuit Courts have attempted to answer the question of
when a claim becomes a claim, four basic tests have developed: "(1)
the debtor's conduct test; (2) the pro-creditor expenditure of response
fair contemplation test; and (4) the legal
costs test; (3) 5the
2
relationship test."
The Second Circuit became the first court to attempt to
53 The debtor
answer this question in In re ChateaugayCorporation.
in the case was LTV Corp. (LTV), a diversified steel, aerospace, and
energy corporation with operations in several states.54 LTV filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with a schedule of liabilities that
included twenty-four pages of claims labeled "contingent" by the
EPA and the environmental enforcement officer from all 50 states
and the District of Columbia. 5 The EPA filed a proof of claim for
$32 million, based on the response costs from LTV having been
named a PRP at 14 different sites. 6 Additionally, the EPA indicated
that LTV could be named a PRP for other states as well, making it
possible that the $32 million proof of claim could be only a fraction

47

See id. at 283.
id.
See id.
50
See Michael A. Bloom, Bankruptcy's Fresh Start vs. Environmental Cleanup:
Statutory Schizophrenia, 6 VILL. ENVTL. L. .. 107, 110 (1995).
"Id. at 110.
"See Pasquarella, supra note 4, at 578.
4
See
49

"4 44 F.2d 997 (1991).

1 See id. at 999.
"See id.
See id.
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of LTV's ultimate CERCLA liability. 57 The EPA argued that a
dischargeable claim did not arise until all of the response costs had
been incurred. 8 The court decided "that if the response costs
concerned the pre-petition release or the threatened release of
hazardous waste, the incurred costs were pre-petition claims,
regardless of when the actual costs were incurred. 5 9
The court began its discussion of the unincurred CERCLA
response costs by accepting the Congressional intent to provide a
broad definition for the term "claim. ' 60 The court then turned its
attention to the EPA's ability to expect future claims against LTV, by
examining the relationship between the EPA and LTV. 61 The court
reasoned that the relationship between environmental enforcement
agencies and the entities they regulate provides "sufficient
'contemplation' of contingencies to bring most ultimately maturing
payment obligations based on pre-petition conduct within the
definition of 'claims."' 62 The court distinguished this relationship
and result from one existing between a tortfeasor and future tort
claimants, who are unaware of injury arising from some sort of prepetition conduct.63
The court then turned its attention to whether an injunctive
remedy should also be viewed as a "claim. '64 The court drew a
distinction between an injunction that asks a polluter to stop polluting
and an injunction to clean up an area already polluted. 65 The latter
would be dischargeable because it creates a right to payment if the
debtor fails to comply with the injunction.66 The former would not be
something and
dischargeable because it is an order to stop doing
67
therefore does not give rise to a right of payment.

"See id.
"See id. at 1000.
59

See Schuh, supra note 37, at 205;

See also Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002

(speaking directly to the conflict between CERCLA and bankruptcy law: "We agree that the
Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA point toward competing objectives. The Code aims to provide
reorganized debtors with a fresh start, an objective that is made more feasible by maximizing

the scope of a discharge. CERCLA aims to clean up environmental damage, an objective that
the enforcement agencies in this litigation will be better served if their entitlement to be
reimbursed for CERCLA response costs based on pre-petition pollution isnot considered to be
a "claim" and instead asserted at full value against the reorganized corporation.").
'See Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1003 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266. "By this broadest possible definition.., the bill contemplates
that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote will be able to be dealt with in the
bankruptcy 61
ease.").
See id. at 1005.
62 d.
6See id. at 1004.
"See id. at 1006.

" See id. at 1007.

"Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1007.

6"See id.
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The problem arises when an injunction contains "'a negative
order to cease polluting' and 'an affirmative order to clean up the
site. ' '' ' In a situation such as this, the court reasoned that an
injunction should not be considered a claim that is dischargeable,
because an owner should not be allowed to maintain a public health
nuisance merely due to bankruptcy. 69 This portion of the decision

seems to be the court's attempt to strike a balance between
environmental law and bankruptcy. However, the previous portion of
the case, by focusing on the debtor-creditor relationship, seemingly
placed a priority on the goals associated with bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Court declined to favor bankruptcy over
environmental policy in In re Gypsum. 70 The case involved National
Gypsum Co. and its parent corporation, Anacor Holding Inc., a
Chapter 11 debtor who had notified the EPA concerning its possible
liability for recovery of cleanup sites. 71 The EPA investigated
Gypsum's potential liability, and filed a proof of claims related to the
debtor's pre-petition conduct at seven sites.72 The EPA attempted to
reserve its ability to later assert CERCLA liability against Gypsum
with respect to at least 13 different sites based on the debtor's prepetition conduct.73
The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Chateaugay decision,
holding that a dischargeable CERCLA claim arose if a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances was linked to the debtor's
However, the court added another
pre-petition activities."'
requirement for making the dischargeability determination. The court
held that the liability for future response claims would only be
dischargeable to the extent the claims could be "fairly contemplated"
by the parties as of the bankruptcy petition.75 The court likened the
necessity of fair contemplation with the notice requirements of the
Code.76 The court then listed several factors to determine whether
fair contemplation of future costs had occurred at any of the
"See id. (citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 (1985)).
'9See id. at 1009 (citing Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S.
494, 507 (1986)).

71139 B.R. 397 (1992) (attempting to answer four questions of law: (1)Whether
future response costs and future natural resource damage costs as the Listed Sites are "claims"
within the means of the Code, subject to discharge; (2) Whether Debtor's environmental
liabilities for the Unlisted Sites arising from pre-petition conduct are "claims" within the
meaning of the Code, subject to discharge; (3) Whether response costs incurred in connection
with property presently owned by Debtors are entitled to administrative expense priority; and
(4) Whether Debtors are jointly and severally liable for claims at the Listed Sites). Id. at 401.
"See id. at 400.
72ld.
"Id. at 401.
"Id. at 407-08.
'51d. at 407. "This court is not willing to favor the Code's objective of a fresh start
over CERCLA's objective of environmental cleanup to the extent exhibited by Chateaugay."

"Gypsum. 139 B.R. at 408.
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particular sites.77 By applying these factors, the court determined that
the sites for which the EPA had filed a proof of claim were within the
"fair contemplation" of the parties. 78 Therefore, the claims were
dischargeable.7 9
The "fair contemplation test" in Gypsum has many of the
same pro-debtor attributes of the Chaleaugay decision. 80 However,
the test is a more restrained approach than one focusing on the
relationship between the debtor and creditor. 81 By removing the
presumption of notice regarding the debtor's liability and by
requiring actual notice that amounts to "fair contemplation," the court
attempted to strike more of a balance between the objectives of
environmental law and the Code.
In contrast, United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal 82
adopts a more creditor-friendly approach and distinguishes itself from
the decision of In re Chateaugay.8 3 The debtor in the case, Taracorp
Industries, operated a smelting refinery that had a contractual
relationship with Union Scrap Iron & Metal (Union Scrap).84 Union
Scrap operated a scrap metal recovery business. A portion of this
operation processed used automobile batteries. 85 From 1979 until
1982, Union Scrap processed used batteries for Taracorp. The
process included removing the battery casing to extract lead battery
plates and smelting the plates to recover the lead. 86 After removing
the casings, Union Scrap stored the plates at their Washington
Avenue Site.87 Plates were shipped from this site, as needed, to
Taracorp's smelting facilities. 88
Taracorp filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in October
1982.89 During the proceedings, Taracorp negotiated with the EPA
regarding their two lead smelting facilities. 90 However, Taracorp did
not acknowledge its own potential liability for the Washington
Avenue Site during the negotiations. 91 Furthermore, the EPA
771d. (listing the following factors: "knowledge by the parties of a site in which a
PRP may be liable, NPL listing, notification by EPA of PRP liability, commencement of
investigation and cleanup activities, and incurrence of response costs.").
"8Id. at 409-10.
79

See id.

"See Ryland, supra note 1,at 767.
"Id.

"United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 813 (1990).
"See Barth, supra note 4, at 219.

"See John P. Perkey, Comment, The Dischargeabilityof CERCLA Cleanup Costs
Incurred After Bankruptcy, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 417, 428 (1992).

Scrap, 123 B.R. at 833.
"Union
861d.
87Id.
"Id.

'91d.
9°Id.
"Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 834.
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contended that it had no knowledge of the contractual relationship
between Taracorp and Union Scrap. 92 If the EPA had known of
Taracorp's relationship to the Washington Avenue Site, it may have
realized the potential CERCLA claim. 93 The Taracorp bankruptcy
reorganization plan was confirmed in 1985, but it was not until 1989
that the EPA 94learned about Taracorp's relationship to the Washington
Avenue Site.
Taracorp argued that its CERCLA liabilities were discharged
when the reorganization plan was confirmed because the release, or
potential release, of hazardous substances occurred prior to the plan
confirmation. 9' Additionally, Taracorp reasoned that because the
EPA knew of at least two of Taracorp's smelting facilities, EPA
should have recognized the possibility of other hazards connected to96
Taracorp's operations and accordingly, filed a prospective claim.
The EPA countered with the argument that the CERCLA liabilities
did not arise until after confirmation because liability for the cleanup
response costs could not arise until the EPA actually incurred the
costs.97 The District Court attempted to answer what it perceived to
be a question of first impression: "[S]hould a party's liabilities for
environmental damages be discharged in bankruptcy when the harm
was done pre-petition, but it was not known at the time to the EPA
that the party was potentially responsible, and when CERCLA
liability could not be incurred until after bankruptcy reorganization
was complete?" 9'
The District Court's ruling in favor of the EPA has two major
focuses. By focusing on the Code's definition of a "claim" as "a
right to payment" and the point in time when an environmental
agency's "right to payment arises," the court agreed with the EPA's
position that its claim arose after the confirmation of the
reorganization plan.99 The court used non-bankruptcy substantive
law to determine when the EPA's claim arose'0 0 under the reasoning
that "a claim only exists when the pre-bankruptcy relationship
between the debtor and third party contained all the elements
necessary to give rise to a legal obligation under the relevant
substantive non-bankruptcy law."'' Applying non-bankruptcy law,
92
931d.

1d.
"Id. at 834-35.

"Id. at 834.
961d.
"Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 834.

98
d. at 835. (beginning its discussion with "The parties see a fundamental conflict
between the goals of the Bankruptcy Act and the CERCLA/Superfund legislation.").

"Id. at 835-36.
"O1d.at 835.

'See id. (citing In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 741, 745-46 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1983)),
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the court concluded that the obligation to reimburse response costs
did not arise until the EPA incurred those costs.'0 2 Therefore, the
claim did not arise until after confirmation of Taracorp's
was not discharged when the plan was
reorganization
03 plan, and thus
confirmed. 1
The second reason that the court used to distinguish this case
from the Chateaugay decision was the EPA's complete lack of
knowledge regarding Taracorp's relationship to the Washington
Avenue Site.' 4 This lack of knowledge disallows the claim from
claim-a claim that would have been
being considered a contingent
05
1
bankruptcy.
in
discharged
The approach used in Union Scrap is far more beneficial to
the creditor than the previously cited decisions. The court clearly
attempts to balance the goals of bankruptcy and of environmental law
by providing that a claim only arises upon the expenditure of funds
by the EPA; yet, once the debtor is notified of potential liability, the
debt can be06 considered contingent regardless of when the funds are
expended.
The court's focus on the EPA's lack of knowledge as a reason
for not discharging the debt, left open the ability of a court to
determine when knowledge exists for an agency to allow for
discharge. This question was addressed in In Re Jensen. 7 The
Jensens were the owners and operators of Jensen Lumber Company
(JLC), a lumber mill that maintained a dipping tank filled with toxic
fungicide to treat wood.108 In December 1983, JLC filed a voluntary
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. 0 9 In February 1984, the California
Water Board (The Board) inspector inspected the premises and
discovered the potential hazardous waste problem if the solution were
to seep into the South Fork Trinity River." 0 The inspector informed
the Jensens of the problem and advised Mr. Jensen that "he should
find another operating lumber mill that could use the fungicide, or
contact an appropriate waste removal company.""' The Jensens
responded that JLC was not going to re-organize and 2that no funds
would be available to dispose of the lumber fungicide."
02
- See id. at 835.
..Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 835.

°41d.
at 835-36.
"0 Id. at 836. "Since Taracorp has not show that the EPA had actual or presumed
knowledge of its potential CERCLA claims during those proceedings and therefore had the
opportunity to file claims but failed to do so, Chateaugay should not be followed here." Id.
"aSeeSchuh, supra note 37, at 213.
...
995 F.2d 925 (1993).

'I55 d. at 926.
1091d.
1101d.

"Id. at 926
2
111d.
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In late February 1984, the Jensens filed a Chapter 7 personal
bankruptcy petition. '
On March 20, 1984, JLC converted its
pending corporate Chapter 11 proceedings to a Chapter 7
liquidation."14 The Board employed the California Department of
Health Services (DHS) to assist in removing the fungicide in May
1984. ' 5 The DHS expended funds to clean up contamination
resulting from seepage of the tank.116 The Jensens were allocated ten
percent of the financial responsibility for the cleanup." 7 The Jensens
reopened their personal bankruptcy action in 1988 to list California
DHS and other parties cleaning up the JLC site as creditors." 8 In
doing so, the Jensens hoped to establish that their share of the
cleanup expenses had been discharged.'" 9
The Bankruptcy court held that the DHS cleanup recovery
claim did not arise until after the petition was filed, and therefore,
was not subject to discharge, 20 The Bankruptcy Appeals Panel
(BAP) reversed, reasoning that the claim was dischargeable because
it was based on the debtor's pre-petition conduct. 12' The Court of
Appeals began its discussion on dischargeability by noting, "the
intersection of environmental cleanup laws and federal bankruptcy
statutes is somewhat messy."' 22 The court attempted to provide what
it believed other courts had not: "adequate consideration to the policy
goals of the environmental laws and the Code."'' 23 In considering the
Code's goals, the court rejected Union Scrap, holding that response
costs must be incurred in order to discharge the claim. 24 Instead, the
court believed that the "fair contemplation test" of In Re Gypsum
most carefully balanced the goals of environmental law and the
'"Jensen, 995 F.2d at 927.
114Id.

II51d.
"'Id. "California DHS spent over $900,000 at the JLC site (including areas other
than the dip 7tank)".
111d.

"90Jensen, 995 F.2d at 927.
121d.,(citing In Re Jensen, 114 BR. 700, 707 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
12'1d. at 927 (citing In Re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 33 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991)).
121d. The court then explained the basic differences that have been previously
illustrated and emphasized a call for reconciliation between the two:
For instance, if a problem exists but has not been found or if a cleanup occurs at an identified
site before liability is determined, can one of the potentially responsible parties get a complete
discharge in bankruptcy? How can a debtor get a fresh start if it is potentially subject to
environmental liability, a large portion of which may be contingent. Notwithstanding what
might be perceived to be diametrically opposed philosophies, the Supreme Court has indicated
more than once that, if possible, these two conflicting objectives should be reconciled. Id. at
928.
23
' Jd. at 929.
1241d. at 928 (citing United States v. Union Scrap & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 838 (D.
Minn. 1990) (waiting for response costs to incur could encourage the EPA to wait until
bankruptcy has been filed before cleaning up the environment to avoid having the claim
discharged)).
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Code. 25 In order to be within the "fair contemplation," one of the
criteria listed in In Re Gypsum was knowledge by the parties of a site
in which a PRP may be liable.12 6 In this case, DHS did not have
knowledge of the Jensens liability prior to the time they filed
bankruptcy; however, the court imputed The Board's knowledge to
DHS. 27 Due to the fact that the potential CERCLA claimant could
tie the bankruptcy debtor to the known release of hazardous
substance that the claimant knew would lead to response costs, a
1 28
Therefore, the response
contingent dischargeable
29 claim existed.
1
costs were discharged.
The decision in Jensen successfully balanced the goals of
environmental law and of the Code. The rejection of Union Scrap's
necessity of expended funds reduced the court's clear favoring of the
environmental creditors and removed the ability of the EPA to
control when it expended funds and thereby to control when the
claim arose. 30 The Jensen court also narrowed the Chateaugay
court's extremely broad definition for a claim, which would seem to
include any hazardous substance contamination, even if the EPA
would have no reasonable way of recognizing the potential claim. 3 '
This decision, by imputing the knowledge of the Board to DHS
test" and provided balance
articulated the "fair contemplation
32
goals.'
policy
the
between
VI. TENSION BETWEEN

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE CODE

As each case has noted, the policy goals of environmental law
and of the Code may seem diametrically opposed.13 Some sort of
resolution must be made in order to satisfy these goals with some
regularity. There are three ways to effectively satisfy these goals: (1)
continue the use of the "fair contemplation test;" (2) amendment of
the Code; or (3) amendment of CERCLA.
A. The Test
Only the "fair contemplation test" establishes an equitable
balance between the interests of the Code and environmental
"'Jensen, 945 F. 2d at 927 (citing In Re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397, 409 (1992)).
1261d.

'Id. at 931 (imputing the knowledge because the California Water Board and
California DHS are agencies of the same state, involving men of the same capacities).
t
28id.
29
' 1d.
See id. at 928
'3tSee Jensen, 945 F.2d 930-31.
132See id.
"'See id. at 928.

J. NAT.

RESOURCES

& ENVTL. L.

[VOL. 17:1

regulations. Basing the test on when the release or the threatened
release occurs favors the Code at the expense of environmental
regulations. This may be viewed as being at the expense of the
public, since environmental regulations were created to protect the
public and CERCLA was enacted to force businesses to cleanup areas
they have contaminated.134 By employing a timing test, a business is
encouraged to file for bankruptcy as soon as the business finds out
about any potential environmental liability. However, a test that
favors environmental law unjustly frustrates the policy goals of the
Code.
Under this timing test, environmental regulators are
encouraged to wait until after the petition has been filed because the
claim will not arise under this test until funds are expended. In
addition to frustrating the "fresh start" bankruptcy policy, the timing
test can actually lead to further environmental damage and higher
costs. If environmental regulators determine it is necessary to wait
until a petition has been filed or the reorganization plan has been
confirmed, the environmental problem will continue to grow as the
business and the regulators play a game of "cat and mouse" for when
to file for bankruptcy.
For these reasons, the "fair contemplation test," which is
based on the foreseeability of the environmental problems, most
effectively balances the objectives of the Code and of environmental
regulations. Instead of encouraging debtors and the environmental
regulators to make decisions based on how and when to file the
bankruptcy petition or based on how or when to pursue an
The
environmental claim, both policy goals are satisfied.
environmental regulators are encouraged to pursue claims once they
establish a foreseeable link to damage instead of waiting until the
bankruptcy petition is filed while damage continues. Furthermore,
environmental regulators need not worry that a debtor has not
revealed its potential for liability because, without any knowledge,
the claim would not be in the "fair contemplation" of the
environmental regulator and would not be discharged. Under the
"fair contemplation test," debtors are made aware of problems sooner
and may attempt to clean up contaminated areas earlier in order to
lower costs and attempt to avoid bankruptcy. Clearly, the "fair
contemplation test" achieves an equitable balance between the Code
and the environmental regulations. Short of amending either the
Code or CERCLA, the "fair contemplation test" should be used to
determine the dischargeability of claims.
B. Amendment to the Code
34

1 See Bloom supra note 49, at 121-22.
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A suggestion that may satisfy both the policy goals of
environmental regulations and the "fresh start" policy of bankruptcy
is to amend the Code to satisfy CERCLA claims before any other
This amendment would give priority to the
obligations. '
environmental regulations and would serve the public well. In
addition to helping clean up environmental problems, an amendment
would also prevent costs of cleanup from being forced upon the
public when the environmental claims are not found to have priority
and there is no money to pay them once the assets have been
exhausted on other debts.
Placing the priority on the environmental regulations rather
than on the other debtors changes the existing priority for payment it would seem at the expense of the other debtors.' 36 However, the
priority change would permit those dealing with potential
environmental debtors3 to shift the costs to the debtor when first
extending them credit.' 7
C. Amendment to CERCLA
A possible way to amend CERCLA would be to allow the
government to attach a lien to all property owned by the debtor to
force payment of the debt. 38 The amendment would serve in nearly
the same way as an amendment to the Code. It would place the
environmental regulations in front of all other debts to attempt to
receive the highest amount of money possible in order to payoff the
debt created by the environmental cleanup. This proposal would
allow secured creditors of the debtor to shift the potential loss of
priority status to the debtor through higher interest rates. The
creditors, knowing the government's potential to usurp their priority,
would be more cautious when lending, or perhaps, those dealing in
toxic waste would need to exercise more caution in order to have
credit extended to themselves.
D. Potential Problems with Amendment
If either the Code or CERCLA were amended, future secured
creditors would be able to include the potential for priority status in
CERCLA claims or liens when extending credit. However, current

... Brian A. Cahalane, Note, CERCLA and the Fresh Start: Quelling the Eternal
Conflict, 4 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 265, 279 (1996).

"'id. at 280.
"'Id.at 280-81.
.iId. at 284.
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secured creditors do not have that ability when they extend credit. A
39
secured creditor possesses a property right via its security interest.
The change of the creditor's priority status could constitute a
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, as a taking
without just compensation.14 Therefore, in order to comply with the
Constitution, it would be necessary to limit the change in priority or
lien status to prospective secured creditors.141
Additionally, it has been argued that neither amending the
Code nor amending CERCLA would actually insure the payment of
Providing priority status to
environmental liabilities.1 2
environmental claims in bankruptcy is not a meaningful solution if
the proceeds from the bankrupt estate constitute only a small amount
of money when compared to the enormous costs involved in
environmental cleanup efforts. However, the amendments, while not
necessarily providing more money for cleanup costs in every
situation, would achieve a better balance between the policy goals of
the Code and CERCLA. In addition, at least some bankruptcies
would result in the availability of more funds for the cleanup efforts.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

The conflict between CERCLA and the Code has raged since
the creation of the environmental regulations. If courts adopted the
"fair contemplation test" on a wider level, they may be able to satisfy
the goals of each act. Unfortunately, whether the courts adopt the
"fair contemplation test" or whether Congress amends CERCLA or
the Code, there is still no assurance that the debts of environmental
cleanup will be paid. Although placing a priority on the claim
provides some comfort, if the debtor has no property to pay the debt
then the costs will still ultimately be passed on to the public.

at 281.
'"Id.

(citing Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Ruggiere (In Re Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth,
"Ol°d.,
Inc.), 727 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1 th Cir. 1984)).
141Cahalane, supra note 134, at 282.
142id.

